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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 05-3745
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

LAURA JEAN BUTURLA,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
District Court No.: 04-cr-769

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 10, 2006
Before: SMITH, ALDISERT and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 2, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Laura Jean Buturla pled guilty to one count of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and
1342) and one count of tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) for embezzling more than
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$350,000 from her former employer, Agip USA, Inc. (“Agip”) and intentionally
misrepresenting her taxable income to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The District
Court sentenced her to a 37-month term of imprisonment, imposed three years of
supervised release, and ordered restitution in the amount of $354,434. Buturla filed this
timely appeal, challenging the manner in which the District Court applied the Sentencing
Guidelines in the wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). For the reasons
set forth below, we will affirm.
I.
From April of 1995 to March of 2000, Buturla was the Human Resources Manager
for Agip. In that capacity, she was responsible for payroll-related issues. She misused
her position to embezzle approximately $354,434. She also misreported her taxable
income for three consecutive years. At the time Agip closed its New York division in
March of 2000, Buturla’s fraudulent conduct was yet undiscovered.
In January of 2001, Buturla began a new job as the office manager at Gursky &
Ederer, a law firm in New York. Between June of 2001 and May of 2002, Buturla
misused the firm’s credit card accounts and overpaid herself from the firm’s payroll. As a
result of her conduct during her employment at Gursky & Ederer, Buturla was charged
and convicted of grand larceny in New York State court. She was sentenced to a 1-3 year
term of imprisonment, served 12 months of that term, and was released on parole on
November 24, 2003.
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Upon completing her term of imprisonment in the State of New York, the United
States charged Buturla with one count of wire fraud, one count of subscribing to a false
income tax return, and two counts of tax evasion in connection with the Agip fraud. On
September 22, 2004, she entered into a plea agreement with the Government pursuant to
which she stipulated to various facts and agreed that the appropriate offense level was 20.
The plea agreement also included a provision in which Buturla agreed to waive her right
to file any appeal that
(a) challenges the sentencing court’s authority to sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the stipulations above; (b) claims
that the facts found pursuant to these stipulations must be charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or (c)
challenges the sentencing court’s determination or imposition of the offense
level if the total offense level determined by the court is equal to or less
than offense level 20, whatever the appropriate criminal history category.
Supp. App. at 7-8.
At her sentencing hearing, Buturla requested a sentence below the Guidelines
range based, in part, on the fact that she had already served time for the New York
offense. The Government opposed this request, and asked the Court to give
“considerable weight” to the Guidelines. The Court concluded that the Guidelines range
was 37 to 46 months and determined that, despite Buturla’s post-offense rehabilitation,
her family ties, and her mental health issues, the appropriate sentence was 37 months.
Anything less, it concluded, would not provide a sufficient deterrent effect and would
lead to unwarranted sentencing disparity.
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Buturla appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court, challenging the
manner in which the Court applied the Sentencing Guidelines in the wake of Booker. She
argues that the Court treated the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 as
justifications for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to
factors to be given equal weight as the Guidelines range. In sum, she contends that the
District Court afforded too much weight to the Guidelines. We find no error in the
Court’s approach, and accordingly, we will affirm.
II.
The Government contends that Buturla waived her right to appeal. Relying on
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001), and United States v. Lockett, 406
F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2005), the Government argues that the waiver of appellate rights in
Buturla’s plea agreement is valid and enforceable. We agree that the waiver is
enforceable. We conclude, however, that the language of the waiver is limited and that
Buturla did not waive her right to appeal the issue she has raised before us. Specifically,
Buturla does not challenge the Court’s authority to impose sentence within the Guidelines
range or contest the Court’s determination or imposition of the offense level. Rather, she
argues that the Court failed to consider and weigh the § 3553 factors. This argument is
not precluded by any language in the waiver.
III.
Although we conclude that Buturla did not waive her right to appeal the issue
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presented here, her appeal nevertheless fails on the merits because we find that the
District Court properly considered the § 3553 factors.
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines could not,
consistent with the Constitution, be applied in a mandatory fashion. It nevertheless
explained that sentencing courts are required “to take account of the Guidelines together
with the other sentencing goals.” Id. at 259. The Court, however, did not explain what it
means to “take account of the Guidelines” or what weight the Guidelines should be given.
In United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, (3d Cir. 2006), we considered the proper
application of the Guidelines in the wake of Booker, explaining that “[t]he advisory
guidelines range is itself one of the § 3553(a) factors” that “provide[s] a natural starting
point for the determination of the appropriate level of criminal conduct,” but we refused
“to adopt a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences.”
Id. at 331-32. Among other things, we noted in Cooper, that “[t]here are no magic words
that a district judge must invoke when sentencing, but the record should demonstrate that
the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and any sentencing grounds properly raised by
the parties which have recognized legal merit and factual support in the record.” Id. at
332 (emphasis added). We have never held, and we decline to do so now, that in
“consider[ing]” the § 3553 factors, a sentencing court must afford any particular amount
of weight to a given factor.
In this case, the District Court acknowledged that the Guidelines were
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discretionary and addressed each of the factors that Buturla raised. It nevertheless
concluded that a below-Guidelines sentence would not further the goal of deterrence and
would result in sentencing disparity. The Court therefore sentenced Buturla to a 37month term of imprisonment, a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. This
explanation is sufficient to demonstrate that the court “considered” the factors, and
accordingly, we will affirm the sentence.

